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
## RESEARCH REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: SOVIET CONNECTIVITY

By LT COL FREDERICK L. MORGENSTERN

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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AIR UNIVERSITY**

**INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:  
SOVIET CONNECTIVITY**

**by**

**Frederick L. Morgenstern  
Lt Colonel, USAF**

**A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH  
REQUIREMENT**

**Research Advisor: Lt Colonel William E. Pecoul**

**MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA**

**February 1986**

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## AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: International Terrorism: Soviet Connectivity

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Reviews the nature of terrorism and definitional complexities associated with this highly emotional and violent form of combat. Transitions to international terrorism and its special problems. Reviews the literature concerning international terrorist objectives. Relates these to massive Soviet support and involvement albeit the great difficulty in finding a Soviet holding a "smoking gun." The evidence although mainly circumstantial points overwhelmingly to Soviet complicity. The author concludes that international terrorism is but a form of Soviet expansionism with documentation of the Soviet connection from the US KKK to IRA to the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick L. Morgenstern (B.A., Rutgers University; M.S.S.M., University Southern California) has a varied tactical background having served on assignments in PACAF, TAC, and USAFE. In addition to fighter WSO experience in all three theaters, he has C<sup>2</sup> and MAJCOM assignments as well as a joint tour embarked with the Commander Second Fleet/Striking Fleet Atlantic (USN/NATO). He served as a stan/eval weapons controller in Thailand in 1967-68 and as Fleet Air Force Officer aboard the USS Guam off Grenada in 1983. Lieutenant Colonel Morgenstern is a 1986 graduate of the Air War College.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Disclaimer-Abstainer	ii
Abstract	iii
Biographical Sketch	iv
Nature of Terrorism	1
International Terrorism	3
Soviet Complicity	8
Conclusion	14
Table A - Soviet Aid to World Terrorism	16
Abbreviations - Table A	18
List of References	20

## NATURE OF TERRORISM

. . . "It cannot happen here." These words were undoubtedly spoken time and again in Uruguay, Rome, Munich, Paris, Stockholm, Madrid, Vienna, and Belfast. Then came the Tupamaros, the Red Brigade, the Front Line, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Black September, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Provisional Wing of the IRA, to name but a few."(1:3)

Terrorism is not new--forms of it have plagued mankind throughout recorded history. The Bible records terrorist's acts as will tonight's paper. There will probably be 10 acts/incidents of terrorism\* throughout the world today. It is extremely difficult to describe terrorism without evoking strong emotions particularly since most of today's targets are innocent victims.

"To give an approximate idea of the growth of international terrorism, in the twenty years before 1969 there was an average of five hijackings per year; in the early 1970s the average was over sixty annually." The decade ending in 1978. . . "witnessed more than 500 major acts of international terrorism including over 65 kidnappings with international ramifications."(2:36)

\*ABC News File--World News 1-13-86.

In order to study and understand terrorism it is first necessary to derive a working definition. The Merriam-Webster 1974 Pocket Dictionary describes terrorism as "the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion" and terror as "a state of intense fear" or fright, panic, dread, alarm, horror, etc. This is too concise so let me expand on some characteristics of terrorism and then develop a definition.

Terrorism is the use or threat of use of violence to obtain one's objectives. Its effects are inherently indiscriminate; its use is arbitrary and unpredictable in terms of victims, audiences, and its effects on society; it implicitly denies recognition of rules or conventions of war, and it rejects all established moral restraints.(3:52-53) It is but one trauma on the full spectrum/continuum of violence. It is national and international in scale and can be found worldwide.

In a very simple, working definition then, terrorism is the conscious exploitation of fear/fright over the victim to have him/her experience a sense of powerlessness. It normally takes the form of a violent act or threat thereof. Fear is a natural human phenomenon and the terrorist exploits this human characteristic for his own ends. This generation of fear is intended for the victim as well as the audience to whom the terrorist is playing. Terrorism is the random and systematic intimidation, coercion, repression or callous destruction of people, and property--it evades a simple and/or universal definition.(4)



Others have noted that in its most simplistic form it is "political persuasion using bullets, bombs, and bravado. . . . Terrorism is generally a weapon of the militarily weak used against the militarily strong. . . ." (5:79)

Terrorism or the terrorist act provides for or produces a number of functions including : 1) provision of a definitive statement about will power (of the group); 2) advertisement of the existence of a group in somehow felt wronged (group is publicized as weak and desperate); and 3) show of resolve. (5) "A fourth function of terrorist activities is their protesting their own impotence. The use of these tactics is, in effect, not only an admission of their impotence vis-à-vis the state, against which they are using terrorist tactics, but it is also a protest saying, "We can't do other than this," and asking the public to acknowledge that. Ironically, at the very time they protest their own impotence, they expose the vulnerability of the state. Which is to say, even the strongest state in the world cannot protect its own citizens from terrorist attacks." (5:80)

### INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The subject of international terrorism electrifies emotions and raises innumerable controversies. Setting aside the emotional aspects, the controversies center on the political/legal questions of whether terrorism can be justified for political reasons. Is terrorism to be tolerated when directed against

an oppressive regime? There is considerable division between developing and developed nations on this question. Many third world countries would brand those as freedom fighters, whereas, most Western democracies would name the same conspirators as (international) terrorists. I find the two groups, i.e. freedom fighters and international terrorists distinct.

Armed insurrection takes the form of direct military confrontation against the established government's military forces. The terrorist avoids direct armed confrontation practically at all costs since the terrorist organization is too small and too weak to survive it.(6) The guerrilla to be legitimate has roots in an organized political party and attacks only military or paramilitary institutions of the state with whom it is at war. Terrorist groups have contempt for the establishment's legal and moral norms and resort to violent deeds for glorification of their cause.(4) They are beyond the "traditional" limits of society and therefore they feel not bound by civilized mores nor laws. The end very often justifies the means resulting in a form of heroism in which violence is sanctified and assassins elevated to the status of martyr. It is a mistake to impart on them the capability for any standard of rationality and humanity.

Terrorism if direct is pursued against members of government, i.e. queens, presidents, members of parliament, and embassy staffs. Indirect terrorism is used indiscriminately against

symbols and constituents of the government in power in order to destroy confidence in the establishment; in order to discredit the government; and in order to weaken those in power. By killing, kidnapping, hijacking, and bombing, the terrorists attempt to show that the government cannot protect its citizenry; cannot maintain its law and order; and cannot survive in its present form. Throughout history, terrorists have succeeded in forcing governmental policy changes in response to violent acts and therefore have succeeded in making terrorism a means to an end.

"International terrorism, then, creates special problems. The lack of territorial jurisdiction precludes the traditional police, internal security, and responses that are appropriate for domestic bombings, murders, and other violence. This lack of jurisdictional clarity inhibits the target government's ability to define and legally control the event.(7:3-4) The US seeks a broad definition at various world forums (UN, etc.) to outlaw all forms of international terrorist activity as crimes against basic principles of humanity. "For the government that is forced to respond to acts of international terrorism, as an innocent victim of circumstances rather than as the target of violence, there are slightly different problems. When the responding government is faced with acts of violence perpetrated by terrorists from another country, or victims that may also be foreign, for political ends for which it has no direct influence, the choice of how to respond is more complex than it would be if it were the target of violence."(7:4) Some of this is analogous to "neutral" and

"nonaligned" nation status during international war/conflicts. This definitional problem of international terrorism . . . "complicates a policymaking environment already convoluted by a multiplicity of national and subnational actors."(7:7)

Victims of international terrorists may only be remotely part of a larger target group such as a government and institution or even military organization. People are not always victims as evidenced by attacks against military installations, power lines, and party headquarters.

"Of particular importance and impact are the incidences of international terrorism in which some or all of the victims are entirely innocent of any association with the real targets of the violent acts and should be, by all international rules of warfare, properly considered as non-combatants and legally protected from such violence. These innocent victims may not be located within a narrowly defined "zone of combat," such as being within the national territory or even of the nationality of the target group or the terrorists."(7:34) Waugh sums up the elements of international terrorism by . . . " the qualifications that the acts:

1. be committed in the territory of a third state,
2. be directed against a national of a third state,
3. be directed against property in a third state,

4. be directed against property belonging to a third state (but, presumably, not located in that state),  
or
5. "affect the interests of a third state."(7:38)

Jenkins of Rand Corporation offers another definition: "The most simple definition of international terrorism comprises acts of terrorism that have clear international consequences: incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign state (diplomats, local executives, or officers of foreign corporations), attack airliners in international flights, or force airliners to fly to another country."(8:20)

Waugh delineates six general strategic objectives that are most common in the literature. The principal objectives are organizational, publicity, provocation, disruption, punishment, and instrumental. Violence is used within and without the organization as a method to create cohesion, that is to say, violence for discipline within and to build morale and outside support from without of the organization. Through today's mass media the act also publicizes the organization's existence or propaganda cause. The provocation objective seeks to create overreaction on the part of the government. Disruption of society is self-explanatory. Punishment is retribution for non-compliance to terrorist demands. Instrumental objectives are the least

supported in the literature although a group might choose an instrumental target to demonstrate their power or prowess.(7:88)

International terrorism is usually state sponsored or as a minimum state supported. Sponsors quite often provide money, munitions, manpower, and propaganda as well as training sites and safe havens. Support is offered to further objectives of the sponsoring state or those of its mentor.

### SOVIET COMPLICITY

The Soviet shoot down of the KAL airliner on 1 September 1983 illustrates the Soviet mindset of the overriding priority of state's rights or political rights over human rights. The destruction of the 269 innocents on board is quite within Soviet thinking because the airliner had erroneously penetrated Soviet borders. Soviet political rights took precedence over the rights of 269 victims to remain alive. Certainly, this is quite contrary to the value associated with human rights in the Western world.

Cline sums this concept well in his preface: "revolutionary violence and guerrilla wars have spread to every continent in the past decade, just as a close reading of Soviet doctrinal literature indicates Moscow had planned. Not only protection of the 'sacred borders' of the Soviet Union is involved, but also penetration of other nation's borders by Soviet revolutionary

activists, guerrilla warriors, and professional terrorists. To the Kremlin's leaders, violence is justified not only defensively but also to support offensive political 'liberation' moves. The persistent strategic pattern of international destabilization and terrorism, assisted by if not always controlled from Moscow has escaped the attention of the majority of U.S. observers. The news media search endlessly for the "smoking gun" of Soviet involvement, overlooking the fact that international training of revolutionary activists is a clandestine business in which fingerprints are concealed and complicity denied. Circumstantial evidence and the logical framework of doctrinal cause and revolutionary effect are all there is to go on in examining the case of the Soviet connection with the current global disorder."(9:X) (emphasis added)

Through the period of détente during the Nixon administration and today's apparent waning of cold relations between the two super powers, Moscow finds that it is not prudent to openly support violent terrorism. It does however, openly indorse guerrilla warfare and insurgency in the name of revolution worldwide. Andropov said it at Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982 and repeated Kremlin support for liberation movements again in December 1982:

The Soviet Union's active and determined struggle for the abolition of colonialism, its unfailing support for the cause of liberation and equality of nations, facilitate their advance towards freedom and progress. This is well known to the peoples of Asia and Africa, the Arab East and Latin America.(10:31)

These "strugglers against colonialism," often known to the rest of the world as terrorists, usually receive training, arms, ammunition and other support from the Soviet Union or from one of the Soviet proxy states. These revolutionaries have a much better chance of success if their support and warehouses are located in safe sanctuaries outside of the state in which they are engaging in warfare.

There is another side of Soviet support to international terrorism that is making it more and more attractive and that is the economic aspect. Terrorism is quite cheap as a form of low intensity warfare and very expensive to counter. As Gorbachev seeks normalization and slowing of the arms race with the West so as to divert Soviet resources to the consumer sector, terrorism becomes much more cost effective in promoting the spread of world communism or world disorder. Viewed in this context, the massive support (mainly in the form of arms) to Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, North Korea, Syria and Vietnam is a very inexpensive method to continue world revolution. This proxy warfare through the proxy state is cheap, all too effective and will most probably continue to expand through the end of the century.

Soviet propaganda in support of terrorism exploits this inexpensive form of warfare. Three types of aid, focus in the (1) overt endorsement of the terror organization through Soviet



controlled media; (2) covert endorsement through third parties, i.e., front organizations; and (3) disinformation campaigns at which the Soviets excel.(14:34) More and more, the disinformation policy seeks to lay blame on the US or on a state friendly to us.

Soviet strategic goals involving terrorism include but are not limited to the following (9:6-8):

1. Influencing developments in neighboring countries--supported overthrow of Shah in Iran, invasion of Afghanistan, establishment of conditions for downfall of Khomeini.
2. Regaining irredentist territories in the Soviet orbit--work to annex portions of Turkey, destabilization of NATO's southern flank, turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
3. Helping to create new states in which it will have considerable influence as a result of its support of those nations' claims for self-determination--assistance to Palestine Liberation Organization.
4. Weakening the political, economic, and military infrastructure of NATO--support of Irish Republican Army, nuclear freeze movement support, demonstrations against GLCM in the Netherlands, West Germany and Italy.
5. Initiating proxy operations in distant geographic locations where direct organized conventional military activities are logistically impracticable--support of SWAPO in Angola against Namibia with South Africa as an ultimate target.
6. Stirring up trouble for the US in Central America through the use of low cost surrogates like Havana and Managua--terrorism raging in Central America particularly El Salvador.
7. Waging a "secret war" against Soviet Union state enemies--assassination of Trotsky in Mexico, attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in the Vatican and countless political murders where only

Moscow could benefit. (There is significant circumstantial evidence linking the Kremlin to the attempt on the Pope's life.(11)

The literature is replete with instances of Soviet support of international terrorism. "Writing in 1906, Lenin responded to critics. . . by asserting that "no Marxist should consider partisan warfare (including political assassination). . . as abnormal and demoralizing." On the contrary, "terrorist partisan acts against representatives of the violent regime are recommended.""(9:9) This same theme of support for worldwide terrorism has been reiterated by Khrushchev in 1961, by Brezhnev in 1964, by Andropov in 1982 and now Gorbachev.

White House Spokesman, Larry Speakes, indicated that there were 695 terrorist incidents last year (1985) as well as 126 aborted terrorist incidents.(12) The most recent, most violent was the Christmastime airport bombings in Rome and Vienna. The acts, reportedly carried out by the Abu Nidal Palestinian terrorist group with Libyan connections, are only the latest engineered by a Soviet proxy state. "Khadafy said he will provide the money and training for Arab guerrillas' "terrorist and suicide missions" and make Libya "a base for the Liberation of Palestine.""(13:18) Libya has been providing this type of support for years but this is the first time that its support has been made this open and vocal.

The US Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism has held numerous hearings in which the preponderance of evidence

overwhelmingly supports the complicity of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in globally netted terrorism. Much of this support is under the guise of national liberation movements. Support includes military as well as political training, provision of equipment (weapons, money, documentation, escape mechanisms), provision of advisers, and provision of propaganda support. "For the expert who reads congressional reports and other files of evidence, the pattern is clear, revealing Soviet strategic responsibility for some of the most troublesome conflicts and terrorist violence upsetting peace and security for millions of people." (9:30)

As mentioned earlier, there is a plethora of documented evidence supporting Soviet linkages of state supported/proxy terrorism. I shall not duplicate the testimonies contained in my List of References. There is an international infrastructure which supports the Kremlin's foreign policy of global destabilization in the non-Communist world. Suffice it to say that there is factual and overwhelming circumstantial proof of Soviet complicity through the KGB and most probably directed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Table A presented at the end of this paper gives some indication of the enormity of the Soviet connection with international terrorism.

## CONCLUSION

The profusion of documentation clearly proves Soviet linkages in the arena of international terrorism from the American KKK and West German WSG with their PLO connections (15:69) through the entire gamut to the Syrian and South Yemen terrorist training camps. The Soviet connection is there without even a chance for plausible denial. The challenge is what can be done about it.

When it comes to dealing with some of the Soviet proxy states such as Syria, Iran or Libya, Mr. Walsh says "The international community should tighten the political, diplomatic, and economic screws while carefully observing developments within Libya." Mr. William Buckley, Jr. advocates declaration of war against Libya. I think these international sanctions have merit for use against the third world countries. Even Buckley's approach makes limited sense.

Sovereign states should have the right of self determination without outside interference. Peoples throughout the world community need to be allowed choice in their own destiny. Coercion from without cannot be tolerated. These thoughts are basic to the American ethic. We cannot allow Soviet dealings in terrorism, i.e., international insurgencies not only because it is against the very grain of the American fabric but because in

the grand scheme of things, Soviet expansionism threatens our very survival.

Cline, former CIA Deputy, sums it very succinctly: "The end game is political: control of people, territory, resources and technology." (9:76) The Soviet strategy is world domination achieved mainly through wars of national liberation aka insurgencies and international terrorism.

The US must adopt a national strategy (9) to block and therefore stop this expansionism. We must flatly denounce Communist interference in political liberation movements. Central America is a classic example, particularly Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Without an effective policy, a fall back and regroup position 10 years from now could well be the Rio Grande River and the parks of El Paso, Texas, USA!

We must play hardball with these low intensity revolutions even if it means, as a last resort, military intervention. Western world pressure accompanying a strong US strategy and policies of non-tolerance for expansionism could work. These brush fires must be suppressed, put out, and their causes alleviated. Economic sanctions alone will usually work over the long haul if supported by the rest of the free world. Economic sanctions will bring Khadafy to his knees but only if supported by the entire West. Diplomacy with and education of our friends is needed to support US foreign policies.

TABLE A (15)

## Soviet Aid to World Terrorism

(according to regional distribution and directness of support)

- 1 = ideological support;  
 2 = logistics support (training, tactical advice, armaments supply, financial aid, documentation, escape, etc.);  
 3 = nature of support not known.

Continent	Country	Organization	USSR	Warsaw Pact	Cuba (Vietnam, Vietnam)	Radical Arab States	Angola, Mozambique	PLA)	Int'l Front (Organizations)
Africa	Angola	MPLA	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	—	—	2	—
	Botswana	BCM	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Central Afr. Rep.	MCLN/UPP	—	—	2	2	2	—	—
	Chad	FROLINAT	—	—	—	2	—	2	—
	Ethiopia	ELF, FPLF	—	—	2	—	—	1, 2	—
	Lebanon	BC P L L A	—	—	—	2(?)	—	—	—
	Malawi	MAFREMO	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	Morocco	POLISARIO	1, 2	2(?)	1, 2	1, 2	—	1, 2	—
	Mozambique	FRELIMO	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	—	—	2	—
	Namibia	SWAPO	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2
	Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	ZANU	1, 2	2	2	—	2	—	—
		ZAPU	1, 2	2	1, 2	1, 2	2	1, 2	1
	South Africa	AM*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		PNC	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2
	Uganda	UNLF	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Asia	Burma	?	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	India	?	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
		Dal Khalsa	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Indonesia	FRPI IN (East Timor)	—	—	—	—	1, 2	1	—
		IRB SR	—	—	—	1, 2	—	—	—
	Japan	JRA	—	—	1, 2	1, 2	—	1, 2	—
		Kakumkyn	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Malaysia	?	—	—	—	2	—	—	—

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TABLE A (CONTINUED)

Continent	Country	Organization	USSR	Warsaw Pact	Cuba (Nicaragua, Vietnam)	Radical Arab States	Angola, Mozambique	PLO	Int'l Front (Organizations)
Asia (cont.)	Pakistan	AZO	2(?)	—	—	1,2	—	1,2	—
	Philippines	MNLF	—	—	—	1,2	—	1,2	—
		NPA	3(?)	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Sri Lanka	TLT	—	—	—	—	—	1,2	—
	Thailand	BRN	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
		CPT	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
		PULO	—	—	—	1,2	—	1,2	—
Europe	France	AD	—	—	—	2	—	1,2	—
		FLB	—	2(?)	—	2	—	1,2	1
		FLNC	—	2(?)	—	2	—	2	—
	Greece	Misc	—	—	—	—	—	1,2	—
	Holland	RH	—	—	—	2	—	2	—
	Italy	PL, BR	—	2	—	2	—	1,2	1
	Portugal	FP-25	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	Spain	ETA	2(?)	2	2	2	—	1,2	1
		GRAPO	2(?)	—	—	2	—	—	—
	Turkey	Agout,	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		PKK (Kurd)	2(?)	2	—	2	—	2	1,2
		DS, IPLA, etc	2(?)	2	—	2	—	1,2	1,2
	(Turkey)	ASALA	2	2	—	2	—	1,2	—
	UK, Ireland	IRA	1,2(?)	1,2	1,2	1,2	—	1,2	1
	West Germany	B2J, RAF, RZ	—	2	2	2	—	1,2	1
		WSG	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Latin America, Caribbean	Argentina	ERP, MPM	—	—	2	2—	1,2	1(?)	—
	Bolivia	FRELINA	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Brazil	VPR	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
	Chile	MIR	—	2	1,2	2	—	2	—
	Colombia	M-19, FARC, etc.	2	—	2	2	—	1,2	—
	Costa Rica	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Dom. Rep.	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Grenada	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Guatemala	—	1	2	—	—	—	1,2	1
	Haiti	HRB	—	—	2	2	—	2	—
	Honduras	CPI.M, FMLN	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Jamaica	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Mexico	MAR	2	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Nicaragua	FSLN	—	—	2	2	—	1,2	1
	Peru	SL	—	—	2	—	—	2	—
	Salvador	FMLN	2(?)	1,2	1,2	2	—	1,2	1
	Uruguay	Tupamaros	—	—	2	2	—	1,2	—
	Venezuela	BR	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
Continent	Country	Organization	USSR	Warsaw Pact	Cuba (Nicaragua, Vietnam)	Radical Arab States	Angola, Mozambique	PLO	Int'l Front (Organizations)
Middle East	Egypt	AELF	—	—	—	—	—	1,2	—
		Al Jihad	—	—	—	1,2	—	2	—
		Al Takfir	—	—	—	1,2	—	—	—
	Iran	—	2	2	2	1,2	—	1,2	—
	—	PLO	1,2	1,2	1,2	1,2	—	—	1,2
	UAE	NDF	1	1	—	1,2	—	—	1
		PFLO	1	1	—	1,2	—	—	1
North America	Canada	Direct Action	—	—	—	—	—	—	1(?)
		FLD	—	—	1,2	—	—	—	—
	USA	AIM	—	—	2	1,2	—	1,2	—
		BLA	—	—	2	1	—	—	—
		KKK	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
		Misc.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		Puerto- Rican	—	—	1,2	—	—	1,2	1
		Weather Underground	2(?)	—	1,2	—	—	1	—

# ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TABLE A (15)

## Terrorist Organizations Surveyed

<i>Initials/ Acronym</i>	<i>Name of Organization</i>	<i>Nationality/ Country of Origin*</i>
AD	Action Directe	France
AELF	Arab Egyptian Liberation Front	Egypt
AIM	American Indian Movement	USA
ALF	Arab Liberation Front	Palestinian
ANYO	Arab Nationalist Youth Organization	Libya-Palestinian
AO	Autonomia Operaia	Italy
—	Apostu/ Apocular	Kurdish (Turkey)
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	Armenian (Turkey)
AZO	Al-Zulfikar Organization	Pakistan
B2J	Bewegung 2 June	West Germany
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement	Botswana
BCP/LLA	Basutoland Congress Party (Lesotho Liberation Army)	Lesotho
HJO	Black June Organization (Abu Nidal)	Palestinian
BLA	Black Liberation Army	USA
BR (It.)	Brigate Rosse	Italy
BR (Ven.)	Bandera Roja	Venezuela
BRN	Barbisian Revolusi Nasional	Thailand
CPLM	Chinchonero People's Liberation Movement	Honduras
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand	Thailand
—	Dal Khalsa	India
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinian
—	Direct Action	Canada
DS	Dev Sol	Turkey
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional	Bolivia, Colombia
FLF	Eritrean Liberation Front	Ethiopia
FRP	Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo	Argentina
ETA	Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna	Basque (Spain)
FALN	Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional	Puerto Rico

\*Palestinian organizations are listed with "Palestinian" nationality- country of origin although their headquarters and bases are scattered throughout the Arab world

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# ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TABLE A (CONTINUED)

Initials/ Acronym	Name of Organization	Nationality/ Country of Origin
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia	Colombia
FLB	Front de Liberation de Bretagne	Bretagne (France)
FLN	Front de Liberation National	Algeria
FLNC	Front de Liberation National de la Corse	Corse (France)
FLO	Front de Liberation de Quebec	Canada
FMLN	Farabundo Marti Liberation National	Salvador, Honduras
FP-25	Fuerzas Populares do 25 de Abril	Portugal
FRELIMO	Fronte de Liberation de Mozambique	Mozambique
FRELINA	Fronte de Liberation Nacional	Bolivia
FRETILIN	Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor	Indonesia
FRONTINAT	Chadian National Liberation Front	Chad
FSLN	Fronte Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional	Nicaragua
GRAPO	Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre	Spain
HRB	Hector Ruidre Brigade	Haiti
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army	Northern Ireland
IRA	Irish Republican Army	Northern Ireland
IRB	Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Board — Suma Ram	Indonesia
JCR	Junta Para Coordinacion Revolucionaria	Latin America
JDL	Jewish Defense League	USA
—	Al-Jihad	Egypt
JRA	Japanese Red Army	Japan
Kakurokyo	Revolutionary Workers' Council	Japan
KKK	Ku Klux Klan	USA
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril	Colombia
MAFREMO	Malawi Freedom Movement	Malawi
MAR	Movimiento de Accion Revolucionario	Mexico
MCLN	Central African National Liberation Movement/Ubangui Patriotic front	CAP
MIR	Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria	Chile
MLN	Movimiento Para Liberacion Nacional (Tupamaros)	Uruguay
NEILF	Moro National Liberation Front	Philippines
MPLA	Movimento Popular Para A Liberacao de Angola	Angola
MPM	Movimiento Peronista Montoneros	Argentina
NDF	National Democratic Front	U/AE
NPA	New People's Army	Philippines
PAC	Pan African Congress	South Africa
PAIGO	Partido Africano da Independencia Guinea Portuguesa des Ilhas de Capo Verde	Guinea, Cape Verde
PFO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman	Oman
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestinian
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command	Palestinian
PKK	Partiya Kurkerten Kurdistan	Kurdistan (Turkey)
PL	Prima Lanca	Italy
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army	Palestinian
PLF	Palestinian Liberation Front	Palestinian
POLI-	People's Front for the Liberation of	Western Sahara
SARIO	Saguat el Hamra and Rai de Oro	(Morocco)
PSF	Popular Palestinian Struggle Front	Palestinian
PULO	Patani United Liberation Organization	Thailand
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion	West Germany
RM	Rode Hulp	Holland
RZ	Revolutionaere Zellen	West Germany
SL	Sendero Luminoso	Peru
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization	Namibia
—	Al-Talib wal-Hijra	Egypt
TLT	Tamil Liberation Tigers	Sri Lanka
TPLA	Turkish People's Liberation Army	Turkey
UNLF	Uganda National Liberation Front	Uganda
Viet Cong	National Liberation Front	Vietnam
VPR	Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria	Brazil
WUO	Weather Underground Organization	USA
WSG	Wichersgruppe Hoffmann	West Germany
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union	Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union	Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)

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